Abstract: The use of mild laws to affect people's behavior is pervasive -from environmental regulation to tort law -but little is known about how the law changes human behavior and social outcomes when it uses non-deterrent monetary incentives. We find that when low monetary incentives are framed so as to indicate what is group desirable behavior, people behave more cooperatively in a public goods game than when no-incentives exist. However, we find that the effect is transitory. Surprisingly, the effect is long lasting when low monetary incentives are presented as payments for some neutral behavior -that is, when the fine is presented as a mere price change. Our findings suggest that the indication of what is group desirable behavior makes salient the conflict between people's normative expectations and what others effectively do. This undermines conditional cooperators' own motivation to contribute to public goods. Neutrally framed price-incentives have a long lasting positive effect on contribution decisions because it does not indicate what one should do and thus avoids the conflict with what others effectively do.
Introduction
What is it about the law that has the potential to change human behavior? Under the standard model of law and economics (Posner, 1973; Kornhauser, 1988; Cooter and Ulen, 1988 ), a law is supposed to change human conduct by altering the returns that individuals get from different kinds of behavior. What is paramount in understanding how law impacts behavior, from this standard perspective, is, to quote McAdams (2000 McAdams ( :1650 , that "by imposing liability or punishment on individuals, the state changes the payoffs so that cooperation rather than defection is the dominant strategy." Thus, again in McAdams's words, "the first step in the causal chain by which law affects behavior is that the formal sanctions law imposes raise or lower the costs of behavior."
Critiques of the standard model argue, however, that laws rarely provide sufficient monetary incentives for the most selfish persons to behave cooperatively when this is individually costly but collectively beneficial (see Engel, 2014) . That is, laws are often non-deterrent in monetary terms. One reason is that deterrent incentives are not feasible for fairness reasons (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000) . Another reason is that, in some cases, the small probability of apprehension cannot be compensated by increasing the level of sanctions. For example, Sunstein et al. (2000) provide questionnaire evidence showing that people do not find it appropriate to increase the level of sanctions to compensate for a low probability of sanctioning.
There are many real-world examples when, in game theoretic terms, the law should not change the options for money-maximizing individuals. Take, for instance, the law that requires grocery stores, in most European countries, to charge a fee for each plastic bag the store provides. As noted in Convery et al. (2007) and in Homonoff (2013) , the fee charged is extremely low compared to the behavioral change sought -i. e., to motivate customers to use reusable instead of plastic bags. In Ireland, the pioneer country in this matter, the law requires grocery stores to charge a fee of 0.15 euro cents, and in the first city in the United States to pass such legislation, Washington, D.C., the fee is as low as 0.05 euro cents. As Convery et al. (2007) show, this amount is too low to motivate moneymaximizing customers to substitute reusable for plastic bags. Engel (2014) and Tyler and Feld (2006) discuss other examples of non-deterrent laws.
If the law does not change the monetary payoffs individuals earn then how can the law change behavior and social outcomes? To go back to our example, Convery et al. (2007) show that the legal requirement to charge small fees for plastic bags is one of the most popular laws in Europe and its effect has, in fact, been dramatic -a reduction in use in the order of 90 %, and an associated gain in the form of reduced littering and negative landscape effects. Thus, even laws that introduce low price-incentives may result in large behavioral changes.
Such laws that rest on low price-incentives are called mild laws (Tyran and Feld, 2006) . The fact that even mild laws may change behavior prompted legal theorists, social psychologists and, more recently, law-and-economics scholars to focus on additional factors that may affect how legal rules impact behavior. One such factor is the power of mild laws to induce law-abiding behavior if the law is perceived as a public expression of what one ought to do (see Feldman, 2009 ). Sunstein (1996) and Cooter (1998) made the first attempts to create a framework of law and economics that recognizes that mild laws may have an expressive function. In this case, the law is not perceived as a mere low price charged for some kind of neutral behavior. Instead, mild laws may also connote wrongdoing if one decided to engage in that behavior and pay the monetary price for doing so.
Despite the existing rich literature on the expressive function of law, reviewed in McAdams (2015) and presented in Section 2, one important question remains unanswered: can mild monetary sanctions imposed by law have other than economic connotations? In other words, the question is whether framing a monetary payment imposed by law as a payment for a socially undesirable behavior will lead to different behavioral patterns than when the payment is for neutral behavior.
We use laboratory experiments, presented in Section 3, to test a specific empirical hypothesis that one may encounter in the expressive law and economics literature -i. e., that mild monetary sanctions may activate norm compliance if they are framed so as to indicate a deviation from the group desirable action (see, e. g., Feldman and Lobel, 2010) . Laboratory experiments may provide several advantages over other methods of empirical investigation in this particular case. The most important advantage is that laboratory experiments allow us to control both the level of the payment imposed for selfish behavior and its framing. We do this by using a public good game. The public good game is a stylized model of a community in which each person's well-being depends on own and other persons' efforts. Individually, each member is better off if he or she contributes nothing and relies on others' efforts to create social benefits by behaving cooperatively. Thus, the public good game provides the closest scenario to real-life settings when some kind of coercion in the form of monetary sanctions may, a priori, increase social welfare. By using the experimental approach, which lies between theory and reality (see Croson, 2002) , we aim at complementing the existing theoretical and field evidence showing that sanctions can be more than mere instrumental means to deter people from a specific behavior.
To preview our results, presented in Section 4, we find that a mild law framed as a sanction for group undesirable behavior (hereinafter, the Sanction treatment) may increase cooperation compared to baseline conditions where nolaw exists. However, its effect is transitory. Surprisingly, lifting the frame by presenting the mild law as a payment for neutral behavior (hereinafter, the Incentive treatment) maintains higher cooperation levels over time. This implies that framing a mild law as a sanction for group undesirable behavior, if anything, reduces the effectiveness of the law over time. We explain the difference between the two treatments by the fact that the Sanction treatment makes salient the norm of conditional cooperation (Fischbacher et al., 2001 ), but freeriding remains substantial because the monetary sanction is mild, which makes conditional cooperators respond by reducing their own contributions. Thus, our findings indicate that when mild laws are framed so as to indicate what is undesirable and desirable conduct, this makes people more sensible to how others behave, which is consistent with the focus on beliefs about what others do in the expressive theory of law. As a related point, we implement a treatment that consists of a mere indication of what is the group desirable and moral behavior (hereinafter, the Message treatment) and we compare its effect to the impact of the Sanction and Incentive treatments. We find, however, that the Message treatment does not affect subjects' behavior significantly. We are able to spotlight the conditions under which the Message treatment may and may not work to change people's behavior.
Why do people obey the law?
The standard economic approach to law focuses on the deterrent effect of law: a law enforced by a sanction increases the cost of the targeted behavior and thereby influences an individual's incentive to engage in that action (see, e. g., Shavell, 2004) . The deterrence hypothesis thus presumes that people's behavior can be changed by manipulating the expected payment for infringing a lawthat is, by changing the incentives.
Written accounts of the deterrence concept date back as far as eighteenth century, when Jeremy Bentham argued that criminal behavior could be deterred by punishment such that the expected discomfort experienced would outweigh the pleasure of engaging in the criminal activity. In the realm of economic theory, Becker (1968) , Stigler (1970) , Ehrlich (1972) , Posner (1973) , and Polinsky and Shavell (1979) , to cite just a few works, laid the theoretical foundations for the deterrence hypothesis. The deterrence hypothesis has been the subject of many empirical studies, which validated its predictions (for an early example, see, e. g., Ehrlich, 1975) . More recently, Drago et al. (2009) , using observational data from a natural experiment, demonstrated that an increase in the expected sentence for future crimes significantly reduces the propensity to commit a crime.
1 Also, DeAngelo and Charness (2012) found that individuals respond considerably to increases in the expected cost of a given behavior, when imposed by law. Furthermore, there exists evidence that the deterrence hypothesis accurately predicts the behavior of people with a criminal past (Khadjavi, 2015) and of those with selfish preferences (Hoerisch and Strassmair, 2012) , but fail to predict the behavior of fair-minded individuals.
In the last two decades, a growing chorus of voices raised to challenge the view that people's behavior can be readily changed with monetary incentives (for a survey, see Frey and Stutzer, 2007) . By the same token, many theoretical and empirical studies reflected the belief that nonpecuniary factors are important in legal compliance decisions (for a theoretical perspective, see Benabou and Tirole, 2011 ; for a survey of empirical studies, see Feldman, 2011) . Luttmer and Singhal (2014) suggest that one area where nonpecuniary factors were prompt to occupy a central place in matters of legal compliance is tax evasion. In this area, the benchmark economic model has been the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) , in which self-interested taxpayers choose how much income to report to the tax authority by trading off the benefits of evasion against the costs. However, this model became less popular in light of the apparent disconnect between its behavioral predictions and the actual administration of tax policy, which often relied on mild sanctions aiming at changing attitudes towards tax evasion rather than to deter selfish individuals (see, e. g., Andreoni et al., 1998) . This led to the development of alternative -and for that matter opposedtheories of compliance. Indeed, some scholars questioned whether deterrence is altogether necessary to encourage individually costly but collectively beneficial behaviors, such as compliance with the tax code 2 (see Dawes and Thaler, 1988 ).
Dawes and Thales, for instance, contend that people often obey rules and norms because this is "the right thing to do" rather than because of the monetary consequences for deviating from the prevailing rules and norms. More sophisticated models have abandoned the "which is better" question.
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During the 1990s, law-and-economics scholars started to manifest an increasing interest in understanding the interplay between the pecuniary and the nonpecuniary factors that might affect compliance with legal rules -this strand of literature is generally referred to as the expressive theory of law. A specific, and influential, view within the expressive theory of law is that a monetary payment imposed by law may affect behavior through two channels: first, by modifying the cost-benefit ratio and, second, by changing the "social meaning" of engaging in the targeted behavior 2 The question of which mechanisms work better to change human behavior has direct implications for the goals that law should pursue. For instance, if monetary incentives do not work sufficiently well, implying that some other mechanism works better, then the law should rather focus on the compensation of victims or some other objective rather than deterrence. Calabresi (1961) discusses the various goals that the law might pursue (see also Marciano and Romaniuc, 2015) .
3 For a discussion of the literature on complex compliance motivations, see Feldman and Lobel (2010) . Romaniuc et al. (2016) analyze experimentally the interplay between two types of compliance intstruments: monetary and social control.
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(see Lessig, 1996; Sunstein, 1996; Cooter, 1998) . 4 Most importantly, the two are not independent from each other. The idea is that a monetary payment imposed by law, even when soft, may change people's views about the social appropriateness of complying with the law. The willingness to seek social approval in human beings has been shown to play an important role in our societies (e. g., Veblen, 1889; Elster, 1989; Bicchieri, 2006) . In this sense, the effectiveness of the monetary payment imposed by law might be reinforced or weakened by its impact on people's perception of the social acceptability of complying with the law. The idea that mild laws may express the reigning norms in a group and can discipline people by showing what is "appropriate" behavior is at the core of Galbiati and Vertova's (2014) experiment. The authors used a one-shot public good game to study the impact of a mild law on cooperation in two different scenarios: while in the first scenario the mild law is implemented as a mere low monetary sanction, in the second scenario the mild law is introduced as a low monetary sanction coupled with a non-binding obligation for subjects to put in a high effort to contribute to the production of a public good.
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According to the expressive theory of law, contributions to the public good should be higher in the second scenario than in the first one. Indeed, the explicitly stated obligation to put in high effort to cooperate may suggest to subjects that cooperating is the appropriate behavior and free-riding on others' efforts is less appropriate. In this sense, the obligation may change the social meaning of cooperation and defection, especially when the obligation comes from a legitimate authority (Sunstein, 1996) . Galbiati and Vertova's results confirm the expressive theory's prediction. The authors, indeed, find that mild laws work only when the low monetary sanction is used in tandem with non-binding obligations to contribute to the public good. Galbiati and Vertova's (2014) findings prompt an important question. The question concerns the interplay of the monetary payment with the obligation to cooperate or, more generally, with any non-binding indication of what one ought to do. In their experiment, the two are separately introduced. However, one might imagine that the introduction of a monetary payment for "wrongdoing" could signal by itself what is socially desirable behavior. Conversely, the introduction of a monetary payment for neutral behavior may leave unaffected people's understanding of what is socially desirable and undesirable -i. e., it suffices to pay the price. That is, independently of any explicit indication of what one ought to do, mild laws may make salient a particular norm if the sanction is framed as a payment for "wrongdoing" rather than a payment for some neutral behavior. This is specifically the hypothesis that we propose to test in this paper using repeated public good games. 6 3 Experimental design
The experimental game
The basic structure of our experimental game follows the well-established design of a repeated linear public good game employing standard parameters. Ledyard (1995) and more recently Chaudhuri (2011) provide elaborate descriptions of how public good games are implemented. In our experiment, groups are composed of n = 4 subjects. Each subject is endowed with E i = 20 tokens at the beginning of each period, which must be allocated to either a public account (g i ) or left on subject's private account (c i ). Each participant i must make a contribution decision g i (0 ≤ g i ≤ 20). Contributions are made in whole tokens, simultaneously and without any communication. In the Baseline, each token left on the private account generates a benefit equal to 1 Ecu. In addition to the tokens kept on the private account, each participant receives a fixed benefit, α = 0.4 Ecus, from the total group contribution to the public account, where 0 < α < 1 < nα. Thus, the individual payoff function (π i ) is the following:
The value provided to individuals by the public good is a linear function of how much of the public good is provided. From 1 < nα it follows that the Utilitarian optimum and the efficient symmetric outcome is for all group members to contribute their entire endowments to the public account. This would, in effect, maximize the gains at the group level (which correspond to nα). However, at the individual level (assuming pure self-interest), each subject is better off from contributing zero to the public account. In our experiment, each session is composed of three segments of ten periods each. In the first segment of each session (periods 1-10), which corresponds to our Baseline, we implement these standard parameters. In the second and third segments, our experiment differs, however, from standard public good games along two main dimensions.
The first dimension we manipulate is the strategic environment within which subjects make decisions. In our Sanction treatment, subjects are informed that 0.3 Ecus will be subtracted from every token not allocated to the public account and which therefore remains on subject's private account. The payoff function in the Sanction treatment is given by
This setup implies that while in the Baseline the return from each token left on the private account was 1 Ecu, this return is reduced to 0.7 Ecus in the Sanction treatment. The intensity, framing, and implementation of the subtraction rule were chosen so as to replicate three specific characteristics of punishments meted out by state authorities. First, the monetary punishment of offenders is typically mild (Engel, 2014) . Also Ostrom et al. (1992) note that many successful communities had frequently recourse to mild monetary punishment. In order to implement a mild punishment, we set the subtraction rule so as to ensure that donating zero remains the dominant strategy of money-maximizing individuals, which preserves the nature of the decision as a social dilemma -i. e., one that pits an individual's interest against the interest of the group. To see why this is the case, consider the individual payoff with our subtraction rule, which yields the following individual payoff function:
contributions from every subject in the group yields π i = 32 Ecus, contributing zero and paying s i = 0.3 for every token kept on the private account, yields π i = 38 Ecus for the free-rider. Thus, a money maximizing individual does not contribute to the public account so long as s i < 1 − α. Second, the punitive nature of the punishments meted out by state authorities is typically clear in real-world settings. Cooter (1984 Cooter ( :1523 argues that costly legal punishment is a payment "imposed for doing what is forbidden" (emphasis added) rather than "the price of doing what is permitted". To emphasize the punitive nature of our subtraction rule in the Sanction treatment, we highlight the fact that Ecus are subtracted when individuals deviate from the action that benefits the group, i. e., when they keep tokens on their private account and therefore do not place them in the public account. Specifically, the instructions read that 0.3 Ecus are subtracted from tokens not allocated to the public account. In public good experiments, it is generally assumed that group members share the understanding that the desirable action of each individual is one that favors the interest of the group and that deviations from this action are undesirable (see, e. g., Andreoni and Gee, 2012) . Our Sanction treatment makes salient this contribution norm by emphasizing that keeping tokens on the private account constitutes deviations from the group desirable outcome and that these deviations have monetary consequences. We avoid using words such as tax, punishment, or sanction in order to minimize experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010) and avoid the possibly varied connotations that participants may attach to this vocabulary.
Third, to mimic centralized government enforcement, we make it clear to participants that the subtraction rule is applied by the central computer. Because the legitimacy of enforcement figures has been shown to play an important role in public goods experiments with centralized punishment (Baldassarri and Grossman, 2011) , we wish to minimize the possibility that the punisher is seen as illegitimate. Thus, while some recent experiments (e. g., Engel, 2014) used a randomly selected subject to act as the punishing authority, we elect to deliver punishment in this treatment through the central computer as the experimenter is most likely to be seen as a legitimate authority (Milgram, 1963; Karakostas and Zizzo, 2016) .
From the Sanction treatment, it is clearly difficult to say whether this treatment may change behavior (or fails to do so) because of the low priceincentive that it introduces or because the law is framed as a threat of punishment for deviations from the group desirable action and thus may implicitly indicate what one should do. To disentangle the two, we introduce the Incentive treatment. Similarly to the implementation of the Sanction treatment, the Incentive is introduced after ten periods played in the Baseline. The unique difference between the two is that in the Incentive treatment, subjects are simply informed that henceforth each token kept on their private account will yield 0.7 Ecus. Obviously, the two treatments have identical strategic environments. That is, in both treatments the return from each token kept on the private account is 0.7 Ecus. The Sanction treatment indicates that the subtraction rule applies to deviations from full contribution to the public account, whereas the Incentive treatment does not contain such a framing.
The second dimension along which the conditions in our experiment vary from standard public good games concerns the information available to subjects when they make their contribution decisions. In the Message treatment, we provide subjects with the following message: "An action is moral if it maximizes the sum of everyone's payoffs. If you were to act accordingly, you would allocate the totality of your tokens to the public account."
7 Instead of obligations, such as studied by Galbiati and Vertova (2014) , it has been suggested that public authorities rather rely on moral messages to encourage behavioral changes (see Torgler, 2004) . The aim of the Message treatment is to improve our understanding of the effectiveness of such messages and compare its impact to the effect of more coercive interventions, such as our Incentive and the Sanction treatments.
The effect of moral messages were first tested by Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2014) in the context of a public good game. For our results to be comparable with existing laboratory studies, we chose to implement the very message that Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2014) used in their experiment. They claim that the kind of message that we implement in the Message treatment creates a focal point through its effect on subjects' beliefs about others' choices.
We introduce the Message treatment after ten periods played in the Baseline, similarly to the Sanction and the Incentive treatments. However, in separate sessions, we also implement the Message after the Sanction or the Incentive treatments had been in effect in the second segment of the game. In this case, the Message is introduced in the third segment, in periods 21-30. This allows us to understand if the Message may work in environments in which individuals had been exposed to mild laws. Table 1 provides information about the three treatments. The baseline condition is omitted since it corresponds to standard linear public goods games.
The message used by Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2014) raises some concerns which are worth discussing before going further. It may seem controversial to have the experimenter claim that maximizing group's payoffs is the moral action to engage in.
The hitherto experimental studies on normative messages -e. g. what is the appropriate behavior in a particular situation -have either allowed subjects to communicate about what they believe to constitute socially appropriate or moral behavior (Andrighetto et al., 2013) or they informed subjects about what their peers thought was socially appropriate to do (Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009) . We accept to bear the cost of this limitation at the benefit of comparing mild laws to a message that proved effective in increasing cooperation in similar conditions to ours. What is more, in order to minimize experimenter demand effects that may result from the experimenter telling subjects what they ought to do, when introducing the message, we make clear that a message will be displayed on each participant's computer screen, and that the message is the same for every participant in the room, but the content of the message does not appear in the Instructions, nor is it read aloud by the experimenter.
Procedures
The experiment consists of six sessions conducted at the Laboratoire Montpellierain d'Economie Theorique et Appliquee (LAMETA) in Montpellier, France. Sessions were conducted between February and March 2015. 20 subjects participated in each session, for a total of 120 participants (60 % were females) invited via the ORSEE software (Grenier, 2004) . 80 % of the subjects were students at one of the universities in Montpellier (the remaining 20 % were non-students) and 25 % of them had an economics background. 88.33 % of the subjects had previously participated in a laboratory experiment. We ensured, however, that none had previously participated in a game with similar parameters. No subject participated in more than one session. Subjects interacted through individual computer terminals. Terminals were separated by lateral partitions to ensure complete anonymity.
The payment was made privately at the end of the session. The exchange rate was 15 Ecus = 1 euro. Subjects earned an average of 21 euros. A session lasted less than 90 min, including initial instruction and payment of subjects. 
Treatment Framing
Sanction An amount of . Ecus will be subtracted from every token that you choose to keep on your private account, and which is therefore not allocated to the public account. Incentive Every token allocated to your private account now yields . Ecus. Message An action is moral if it maximizes the sum of everyone's payoffs. If you were to act accordingly, you would allocate the totality of your tokens to the public account.
At the outset of each session, subjects were informed that the central server would allocate them randomly to groups of four people. Group assignments remained the same for the entire session. That is, partner matching conditions were in effect. Each session consisted of 30 periods, divided into three segments of 10 periods. The total number of segments in the session was common knowledge, 8 as was the fact that at the end of the experiment only one segment out of the three would be chosen at random for payment. This design allows us to limit the effect that cumulative earnings may have on subjects' decisions, which may lead them to care less about the consequences of their decisions in the last periods of the game. In each session, subjects first played 10 periods of a standard public good game, which corresponds to our Baseline. The same subjects then played another 10 periods in one of these treatments: Sanction, Incentive, or Message. When the Sanction or the Incentive treatments were implemented in periods 11-20, then in the last segment of the game, that is in periods 21-30, subjects were informed that the game is identical to periods 1-10 except that a message will be displayed on their computer screens. Table 2 provides detailed information about the order of the treatments and the described segments.
We chose this design for two reasons. First, we make subjects play the first 10 periods under Baseline conditions because we want to identify what makes the Sanction, the Incentive, and the Message treatments work in a realistic and belligerent situation in which groups become accustomed to significant degrees of free-riding. This creates a challenging environment for each of our treatments. Second, the addition of a third segment allows us to identify the effect of using 8 Subjects were informed about the total number of segments for the simple reason that we wanted to avoid strong restart effects that are generally due to an unexpected restart of the same game. The restart effect is arguably less pronounced when subjects know in advance that the experiment consists of more than one segment (see Andreoni, 1995) . 9 This procedure of not paying for all periods has been used by others in public good games, e. g. Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Goeree et al. (2002) . Goeree et al. (2002) argue that paying for all decisions may provide higher incentives, but paying for only some decisions may induce subjects to think more clearly about the payoff consequences of each decision rather than focus on the relative earnings aggregated over all decisions.
the Message treatment in an environment in which groups had been accustomed to mild laws -i. e., when subjects had been exposed to monetary payments in the form of a Sanction or an Incentive. We can thus test whether these different types of instruments, monetary and non-monetary, conflict with each other.
Results
The presentation of the results is divided into two parts. First, we answer our two primary questions: (i) do mild laws activate norm compliance if they are framed so as to indicate a deviation from the group desirable action versus when they are framed as payments for some neutral behavior, and (ii) are moral messages capable of changing human conduct in the same way as more coercive interventions do? Second, we discuss the interaction between the moral message and the two types of mild laws -in the form of Sanctions and Incentives.
4.1 Which of the sanction, incentive, and message improve cooperation? Figure 1 illustrates the evolution over time of average contribution levels. It gives the individual contribution level in each period, averaged over the ten groups that make up each treatment. We can see that in the first 10 periods, before the Sanction or the Incentive could be applied, average contribution rates are nearly identical in the four sessions which make up the two Baseline conditions. On average, contribution levels seems to be higher in the Baseline that preceded the Message treatment. However, the difference between the three conditions is not significant. Table 3 also provides detailed information about the change in mean contributions between the three treatments and the corresponding Baseline conditions. Panel A shows the difference in mean contributions between each treatment and the Baseline over the entire segment of 10 periods. That is, it illustrates the change from periods 1-10 to 11-20. Panel B restricts the analysis to the difference between the last 5 periods in each treatment versus the last 5 periods in the Baseline -i. e., periods 6-10 versus 16-20.
Panel A shows that when the Sanction is implemented in periods 11-20, average contributions increase compared to periods 1-10, from 5.86 to 8.72 tokens. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates that the difference is significant at p < 0.05. However, it should be noted, from Panel B, that the effect of the Sanction is transitory. When we compare the last 5 periods played in the Baseline to the last 5 periods under the Sanction, we find that the difference between the two is only weakly significant under a two-tailed test (p-value of 0.092). This is due to the clear decay in contributions over time under the Sanction treatment, which can be seen from Figure 1. Figure 1 also indicates that lifting the frame, under the Incentive treatment, increases contribution levels by comparable amounts to the Sanction, relative to Baseline conditions. In effect, average contributions increase from 5.20 to 8.78 tokens. Table 3 shows that according to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, the difference between the Incentive and the Baseline is significant (p < 0.05). Interestingly, while we find that the Sanction causes a transitory increase in average contributions, the Incentive maintains higher average contributions also over the last 5 periods. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test of the difference between the Baseline and the Incentive in periods 6-10 and 16-20 respectively shows that it is significant at the 5 % level. This tells us that while both the Sanction and the Incentive increase contribution levels relative to the Baseline, only the Incentive is able to maintain higher average contributions over time.
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Now the question is whether a non-costly moral message may also improve cooperation. This is an important question since non-costly messages are relatively inexpensive means to change human behavior. Contrary to Dal Bo and Dal Bo's (2014) findings, we observe no significant change in average contributions between the Message treatment and the Baseline. In fact, in periods 11-20, under the Message, contributions tend, if anything, to decrease compared to the Baseline: from 8.01 tokens under the latter to 7.08 under the Message. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates, however, that the difference is not significant under a two-tailed test (p-value = 0.16). Since the matching protocol is the only major difference between Dal Bo and Dal Bo's (2014) design and ours, 11 we conclude that the Utilitarian message used by Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2014) may create a focal point only in groups that constantly change. That is, it fails to do so when the group composition is fixed, as is the case in our experiment. This result does not imply that groups with a fixed composition are always insensitive to the message designed by Dal Bo and Dal Bo. Our experiment rather points to a particular condition under which this may be the case:
10 A Mann-Whitney ranksum test for the difference between the Sanction and the Incentive treatments indicates that the difference is non-significant. 11 It is worth noting that Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2014) study the effect of different messages and subjects are informed that the computer will randomly select one message from a set of five possible messages. This was done in order to avoid that high contributors interpret the message as a signal that contributions are lower than expected by the experimenter, infer that they themselves are contributing too much and respond by contributing less. However, using a hurdlemodel, we found no evidence that the message has different effects on free-riders and on contributors respectively. The results from this model are available upon request from the author.
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the history of the play prior to the implementation of the Message may prevent subjects from updating their beliefs in an optimistic direction when they expect to face the same group mates (Crawford et al., 2008 is another study showing the limited power of focal points). This provides additional support for empirical and experimental works that stress the importance of expectations and of the history of the play that one shares with his or her group-mates 12 (see, e. g., Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009) .
To get further insights into how the Sanction, the Incentive, and the Message affect behaviors at the individual level, we employ a parametric data analysis. Our dependent variable is doubly censored since subjects may contribute a minimum of nothing and a maximum of the endowment to the public account. Thus, a two-limit Tobit model is required to estimate subjects' responsiveness to experimental variables (Bardsley and Moffatt, 2000 provide a detailed discussion of random effects two-limit Tobit models in the context of public good games). Table 4 reports two random effects Tobit regressions analyzing the determinants of the contribution decision. It is revealing, first, to examine the pooled distribution of contributions. A histogram of this variable is shown in Figure 2 . The histogram clearly reveals censoring at the lower limit 0 and at the upper limit of 20.
In the two regressions presented below (Table 4) , data from Baseline before the Sanction or the Incentive could be applied have been pooled together. In models (1) and (2), independent variables include a treatment dummy, and a control for the effect of the period due to the repetition of the game, labeled Period. Model (2) adds two interaction terms between each treatment and gender (taking the value of one if the subject is a male and zero if the subject is female), and subjects' discipline of study (taking the value of one if the subject has an economics background and zero otherwise).
Tables 4 indicates that contribution levels are higher under the Sanction and the Incentive treatments than under the Baseline -even more so under Incentive than under Sanction relative to Baseline conditions. Also, we find that under the Incentive treatment, male subjects contribute significantly more than females. This is in line with some previous experimental studies who found, for example, that males show a stronger positive response to priceincentives than females (e. g. Bazart and Pickhardt, 2011) . Finally, it appears that subjects with an economics background are significantly less sensitive to price-incentives than "non-economists". This means that price-incentives fail to increase cooperation -a conclusion put forward by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) -but this conclusion applies only in a small set of cases: when the targeted population are "economists".
Tables 4 also confirms the results from the non-parametric tests, namely that the Message is the only treatment that fails to increase average contributions relative to the Baseline. 
Note: Standard errors, in parentheses, are bootstrapped. ** Indicates significance at 5 % level. *** Indicates significance at 1 % level.
Result 1: The Sanction and the Incentive treatments result in higher average contribution levels relative to Baseline conditions. Contribution levels are not higher under the Message treatment than under Baseline conditions, suggesting that the power to act as a focal point is limited by the fixed group composition.
As we noted above, the Sanction and the Incentive treatments do not impact subjects' behaviors in the same manner. While the Sanction treatment appears to have only a transitory positive effect on contribution decisions, the Incentive treatment maintains higher contribution levels over time (see Table 3 , Panel B). The difference between the two treatments is that the Sanction imposes a low price-incentive for the decision not to contribute to the public account, similarly to the Incentive, but it also contains an implicit indication of what is the group desirable action. As the price-incentive is low, many subjects still deviate from the group desirable behavior. The indication of what is desirable from the group perspective creates, however, additional expectations among conditional cooperators that one "should" cooperate. Therefore, the sudden decrease in contributions may be interpreted as a punishment that conditional cooperators inflict to those who do not contribute but who "should". This is not the case under the Incentive treatment which was presented as a reduction in the return from the private account -i. e., as a reduction in return from a neutral behavior.
To test for this explanation, we need to consider behavior at the individual level by taking into account the impact of group contributions at period t on any group member's decision at period t + 1. We expect individual contribution decisions to be linked to the previous group contributions in the Sanction treatment, but not in the Incentive one. Table 5 reports results from a random effects Tobit regression in which the explanatory variable is the individual change in the contribution decision from period t to period t + 1 as a function of the treatment and of the group contribution in t, controlling for time/period effects -ceteris paribus, contributions decrease with the repetition of the game. In other words, this tells us how a subject i reacts to the information he or she receives after each period about the aggregate level of contributions in his or her group. In effect, in our experiment, this is the only information subjects received at the end of each period. Table 5 indicates that the information about the aggregate level of contributions impacts contribution decisions in the Sanction treatment, but this is not the case in the Incentive treatment. This supports our hypothesis that the particular framing that one "should" cooperate renders the information about past aggregate contributions important in the Sanction treatment. Mere price-incentives, on the other hand, do not make salient such expectations. Engel (2014) proposes a model showing how neutral mild laws may lead to large behavioral changes simply because individuals are inequity-averse. In our experiment, we observe that such neutrally framed mild laws are effective over time.
Result 2: The Incentive treatment, which corresponds to neutrally framed mild laws, has a long lasting positive effect on contribution decisions because it does not indicate what one should do and thus avoids the conflict with what others effectively do.
The interaction between the moral message and the mild laws
There are two questions we want to answer here. First, we want to understand what is the effect of the Message treatment when it is implemented in a neutral environment in periods 11-20 compared to when used in an environment in which subjects had been accustomed to mild laws in the form of sanctions or incentives -i. e., the message is in effect in periods 21-30. Second, we want to understand whether mild laws are more effective when employed in a "neutral" environment -i. e., after the Baseline -than when preceded by the message indicating what is the "moral behavior". A real concern in answering these questions is that our design cannot disentangle two possible confounding effects: (i) a pure treatment effect and (ii) a time effect. The reason is that we are not comparing treatments in the same periods here. As we know from the existing literature, average contributions significantly decline over time (see Keser and van Winden, 2000) . Consequently, we might reasonably expect lower contribution levels in our third segment -periods 21-30 -compared to the second segment -periods 11-20 -ceteris paribus. In other words, the results should be interpreted with caution because the effects of each treatment in periods 21-30 are, obviously, underestimated compared to their impact in periods 11-20. To answer the first question, we compare average contributions under the Message in periods 11-20 to average contributions under the same treatment but when implemented in periods 21-30, either after the Incentive or after the Sanction treatments. When the Message is introduced at the end of the Sanction treatment, subjects contribute on average 6.5 tokens to the public account over periods 21-30. This is not statistically different from the 7 tokens contributed on average in periods 11-20 under the same treatment following the Baseline. We also find no significant difference when we compare average contributions over periods 21-30 when the Message is preceded by the Incentive (6.98 tokens) to average contributions under the Message in periods 11-20 (Table 6 ).
To answer the second question, we compare average contributions under the Sanction in periods 11-20 to average contributions under the same treatment but when it is in effect in periods 21-30, after the Message treatment. From Table 5 , it appears that, despite time effects, individual contributions are slightly higher, on average, when the Sanction follows the Message (10.81 tokens) than when it is implemented after the Baseline (8.72 tokens). However, the difference is not significant. Finally, it should be noted that the Sanction treatment displays the same trend over time in both cases, when used in periods 11-20 and when it is implemented in periods 21-30, there is a decay in average contributions over time.
Result 3: The Message is ineffective at improving cooperation regardless of whether it is introduced in a neutral context or in an environment in which subjects had been accustomed to mild laws. Conversely, the Sanction treatment is effective both when employed in a neutral environment and when introduced after the moral message. However, average contributions always decay over time under the Sanction treatment regardless of the environment in which it is implemented.
Conclusion
The change in social attitudes and expectations is at the core of expressive law theories which argue that mild laws can change human behavior by changing the social meaning of the targeted behavior and thereby people's beliefs about how others will behave in the future. As our experiment demonstrated, when mild laws are framed so as to indicate what is the group desirable action, cooperation rates are indeed affected by this particular framing. However, the effect is rather negative over time. The mere observation that others continue to follow their self-interest motivates conditional cooperators to reduce their own contributions. In other words, we found that cooperation is undermined when mild laws make people focus on the conflict between normative expectations ("what is believed to be desirable behavior at the group level") and the actual behavior of others ("what people observe that others do"). This is in line with Bicchieri and Xiao (2009) who show experimentally that managing empirical expectations (i. e., what others do) is crucial for designing institutions that encourage cooperative interactions. We complement this literature by suggesting one way to overcome the conflict between normative and empirical expectations: lawmakers should be careful to present mild laws as mere reductions in the return from a neutral behavior. We showed that this kind of intervention is more likely to maintain higher cooperation rates over time. Why would mere low price-incentives change people's work to change people's behavior? Engel (2014) suggests that inequity-averse individuals will react positively to low payments imposed by law. Although this seems to corroborate the traditional model of law and economics that considers a fine as a price, this conclusion would be incorrect for two main reasons. The first reason is that from the traditional law and economics perspective, the framing of the law should not matter at all. Our results, however, suggest that the particular framing is important since it creates additional expectations among the behavior of the relevant parties. The second reason is that from the standard law and economics standpoint, mild laws in general should not affect behavior because they do not modify the relative attractiveness of cooperation compared to defection. Our results suggest that, at least under our experimental conditions, the traditional framework does not provide accurate predictions about how mild laws impact human behavior.
The role of expectations is also at the core of our second finding -that the message indicating what is moral behavior fails to increase cooperation. As we have shown, the principal limit to the functioning of such a message is the fact that when people interact with the same individuals over time they expect the payoff-irrelevant message to have no impact on free-riding. This feature of human interactions -stable groups -prevents, in effect, people from updating their beliefs in an optimistic direction when they know that they will keep interacting with the same neighbors, or office colleagues. Our experiment, thus, spotlighted the conditions under which indications from central authorities about what is moral behavior are not effective. Since many real-world dilemmas involve stable groups, we conclude that such indications about what is moral behavior cannot replace the current legal system that rests mainly on mild monetary punishments.
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Appendix: Instructions (originally written in French)
General rules
The experiment in which you are going to participate is part of a study on decision-making. Please read the instructions carefully. These instructions are meant to help you understand the experiment. Once all of the participants have read the instructions, the experimenter will then reread the instructions aloud.
Your gains will depend on your decisions as well as the decisions of other participants. All of your responses will be anonymous and will be gathered via a software program. You will indicate your choices on the computer in front of which you are seated, and this computer will calculate the gains you have realized in the course of the experiment. The sum total of money gained during the experiment will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. From this moment on, we ask you to refrain from speaking. If you have a question, please raise your hand and an experimenter will help you in private.
The experiment is composed of three parts. Each part is made up of several periods. The instructions for Part 2 will be distributed to you once Part 1 has been finished, and the instructions for Part 3 will be distributed once Part 2 has been finished. One of the three parts will be drawn at random for payment. Your gain for the experiment will be equal to the gain you obtained during this Part. In the three parts, the gains are expressed in ecus. The conversion rate of emus into euros is 15 ecus = 1 euro.
At the beginning of Part 1, the central computer will create groups of four at random. The composition of the groups will remain unchanged for the duration of the experiment. You will not be able to identify the other members of your group and they will not be able to identify you.
Part 1
This part is composed of ten periods. At the beginning of each period, you as well as the other three members of your group will have an amount of 20 tokens that you must allocate between two accounts: your individual account and a collective account belonging to all of the members of your group (you included). Specifically, you must decide on the number of tokens that you put in the collective account. The remaining tokens are automatically placed in your individual account. You are free to put any whole number of tokens between 0 and 20 into the account.
Individual account
Each token placed in your individual account earns you 1 ecu. And so, if for example, you put 6 tokens in your individual account, this will earn you 6 ecus. Your individual account only earns ecus for you alone.
The collective account
The collective account is shared by all members of your group. Each token placed in the collective account earns 0.4 ecus to each member of the group. Thus, if for example, you put 6 tokens in the collective account, this will earn 2.4 ecus for each member of the group (you included), amounting to a gain of 9.6 ecus for the entire group.
Gain
Your gain for the period is equal to the sum of the gains of your individual account and the collective account.
Example 1
You put 16 tokens in the collective account and thus 4 tokens in your individual account (put there automatically). Let us suppose that the three other members of your group put a total of 48 tokens in the collective account. In total, the collective account now comprises 48 + 16 = 64 tokens. Your gain is then equal to 4 ecus (individual account) + 64 * 0.4 (collective account) = 29.6 ecus.
Example 2
You put 3 tokens in the collective account and thus 17 tokens in your individual account. Let us suppose that the three other members of your group put a total of 40 tokens in the collective account. In total, the collective account now comprises 40 + 3 = 43 tokens. Your gain is then equal to 17 ecus (individual account) + 43 × 0.4 (collective account) = 34.2 ecus.
Final Details
All of the members of your group (you included) will make their decisions simultaneously. When all of the members of the group have made their decision, a summary screen will appear. The screen will remind you of the number of tokens that you have placed in each of the two accounts and inform you of the number of tokens placed in the collective account by your group, and of your gain in ecus for the period.
At any time you can access the history of previous periods by clicking on the history button. The history will appear for each past period, the number of tokens that you put in each of the two accounts, the total number of tokens put in the collective account by your group, your gain in ecus for the period, and your cumulative gain since the first period of that Part.
Part 2
This part is also composed of 10 periods. The composition of the groups is unchanged. Your group is therefore composed of the same members as in Part 1. As in the preceding part, at the beginning of each period, you will have an amount of 20 tokens that you must allocate between your individual account and the collective account.
Additional instructions
From now on, the tokens that you do not put in the collective account, and that remain therefore in your individual account, are subject to a 30 % deduction. Thus, 0.3 ecus are deducted for every token that remains in your individual account. This deduction is applied in each period. If for example, you put 12 tokens in your individual account, your gain from this account is 12 − 12 × 0.3 (deduction) = 8.4 ecus.
The functioning of the collective account is the same as in Part 1 of the experiment: each token placed in the collective account therefore earns 0.4 ecus for each member of the group (you included).
Your gain for the period is still equal to the sum of the gains of your individual account and the collective account.
Example
You put 6 tokens in the collective account and therefore 14 tokens in your individual account. Let us suppose that the three other members of your group put a total of 26 tokens in the collective account. In total, the collective account now comprises 26 + 6 = 32 tokens. Your gain is thus equal to 14 (individual account) -14 × 0.3 (deduction) + 32 × 0.4 (collective account) = 22.6 ecus.
Part 3
This part is also composed of 10 periods. The composition of the groups is unchanged. In the same way, at the beginning of each period, you have 20 tokens that you must allocate between your individual account and the collective account. The functioning of these two accounts is the same as in Part 1. Thus, each token placed in your individual account earns you 1 ecu.
Additional instructions
At the beginning of each period, every participant in this room will have a message displayed on his or her computer screen. The message is the same for everybody.
